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Résumé / Abstract 
 
On montre qu’il existe un continuum de règles de subvention basées sur un indice de 
performance qui peuvent inciter un monopoleur à produire la quantité qui maximise le bien-
être social. Avec ces règles, le gouvernement paie un montant total qui est de beaucoup 
inférieur à celui qu’il devrait payer dans le cas standard d’un taux d’aide constante. Le taux de 
subvention variable dépend de la valeur d’un stock qui reflète l’histoire de performance du 
monopoleur.  
 




We provide a continuum of subsidy rules based on a performance indicator that induce a 
monopoly to choose the socially optimal production level. These subsidy rules result in a 
reduction of the amount of subsidy paid to the monopolist compared to the standard case 
where a constant subsidy rate is used. The subsidy rate depends on a state variable that 
reflects the monopolist's history of performance. This variable depreciates over time, 
therefore requiring a permanent effort of the monopolist to maintain it at an optimal level. In 
an example with a linear demand and no production cost, the subsidy costs of inducing 
efficiency are reduced by almost fifty per cent. 
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1. Introduction
According to the conventional theory, the output of a monopoly is
below the socially optimal level, and therefore a per unit subsidy set at
an appropriate rate is required to restore eﬃciency. Textbook writers
often add the remark that such a subsidy is likely to be unpopular,
because it would make the monopolist even richer. In this paper, we
show that there exists a family of linear-in-output subsidy rules that
would (i) induce the monopolist to produce at the socially optimal
level, and (ii) economize on the payments to the ﬁrm. The trick is to
make the subsidy rate (per unit of output) dependent on an index of
the history of the monopolist’s past performance.
T h ea r g u m e n ti sa sf o l l o w s .T h er e g u l a t o rc r e a t e sa" p e r f o r m a n c e
index" that summarizes the monopolist’s past behavior. A high value
of the index indicates a history of good performance. This index is
continuously updated as the monopolist’s output is observed. The
subsidy rate (per unit of output) paid to the monopolist at each mo-
ment is speciﬁed as an increasing function of the current level of the
index. The formula for updating the index is announced from the out-
set, and thus the monopolist can optimally plan to build up the level
of the index through its production. This index is may be regarded as
an intangible asset. Technically, it is a state variable in a well deﬁned
optimal control problem. The index may also depreciate over time1.
The regulator decides on the depreciation rule to be applied to the
index. Because the subsidy rate per unit of output is made dependent
on the index, the production of the monopolist at a given moment
aﬀects both (a) its proﬁt at that moment, and (b) the future subsidy
rates and thus future proﬁts.
We show that there exists a continuum of such subsidy schemes
that induce the monopolist to achieve the socially desirable level of
production at each moment. Each subsidy scheme in this continuum
1In fact, it is as if we have turned the static monopoly into a producer of a
durable good that depreciates over time. (See Malueg and Solow (1989) and Karp
(1996) on durable good monopoly).2
generates an inﬁnite horizon dynamic optimization problem for the
monopolist, and his optimal production path is shown to be a constant
path that coincides with the socially desirable output level.
The multiplicity of eﬃciency-inducing subsidy schemes is a positive
result from the regulator’s view point. In addition to implementing
the ﬁrst best, the regulator could use the subsidy schemes to address
other concerns such as the allocation of surplus between consumers
and producers (in this case the monopolist).
In this article, we focus on linear subsidy rules for regulating a mo-
nopolist. Of course, alternative methods of regulations are available2.
However, in general these methods require the ability to make lump
sum transfers. For example, ﬁx i n gap r i c ec e i l i n ge q u a lt ot h em a r g i n a l
cost at the socially optimal output level would make the monopoly in-
cur losses in the case of decreasing average cost, and thus a lump
sum transfer would be required to cover such losses. The only market
based method of regulation-without lump sum transfer- that achieves
the eﬃcient outcome is the use of an appropriate per unit subsidy.
Our emphasis is on reducing the cost of subsidies without sacriﬁcing
eﬃciency. There are many reasons why such economies may be desir-
able. The ﬁrst reason that comes to mind, at least to non-economists,
is the distributional concern: the subsidies make the rich monopolist
even richer. A second reason is that the subsidies must be paid for by
raising taxes, which is politically unpopular3, and economically dis-
tortionary4. A third reason is that governments might be bound by
international treaties that restrict t h ee x t e n to fs u b s i d i e s .W er e f r a i n
from dwelling on these issues.
2See, for instance, Rees and Vickers (1995), Bishop et al. (1995).
3One is reminded of Edmund Burke’s witticism: "To tax and to be liked, just
as to love and to be wise, is not given to men."
4Revenue raising by taxes (other than lump sum taxes) are distortionary. This
realization has led to the concept of “marginal cost of public funds” (see, e.g.,
Browning, 1976, Ballard et al. 1985 for theory and empirical measures). We do
not wish to incorporate this into our model, in the interest of simplicity.3
2. The basic model
2.1. A review text-book linear subsidy schedule
In this section we consider a monopolist in a static environment.
The inverse demand function is p = p(q) and the total cost function




0(q) < 0 (1)
and marginal revenue, p(q)+qp0(q), falls as q rises. We make no
restriction on the sign of c00(q). Thus marginal cost can be falling,
or rising. We only requires that if the marginal cost is falling, its
slope at the point of intersection with the marginal revenu curve is
less nagative than the slope of the marginal revenue curve. In the
absence of tax or subsidy, the proﬁtf u n c t i o ni s
R(q) ≡ p(q)q − c(q) (2)
We assume that R(q) is strictly concave5. (This does not imply that
c(q) is necessarily convex.) Note the assumption c(0) = 0, it implies
that if the monopolist’s output is zero, his proﬁti sz e r o 6.T h i si nt u r n
implies that the monopolist’s maximized proﬁti sn o n - n e g a t i v e .T h e
monopolist maximizes proﬁt by equating marginal revenue to marginal
cost. Under laissez-faire (i.e., if there is no tax or subsidy) his output








At output qL, the monopolist’s proﬁti sR(qL) > 0. The socially opti-
mal output level is denoted by qso.A tqso, price is equal to marginal
5If the proﬁt function is not strictly concave, the problem of designing optimal
tax and subsidies can be very complicated. See, for example, Guesneries and
Laﬀont (1978), also Laﬀont (1987, pp. 81-83).
6This assumption is made for simplicity, it is straightforward to generalize the
conclusions of the paper to the case where c(0) = f where f represents a positive
ﬁxed cost.






We assume that (3) has a unique solution.
The usual textbook prescription is to subsidize the monopolist’s





so > 0 (4)
In other words, s∗ is the diﬀerence between the price p(qso) and the
marginal revenue p(qso)+p0(qso)qso (both evaluated at the socially
optimal output level ).
To show that the monopolist who faces this subsidy rule would
choose qso, we note that, given any constant subsidy rate s, he chooses
q to maximize the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
π(q,s) ≡ p(q)q − c(q)+sq ≡ R(q) − sq (5)






Clearly, qso,a sd e ﬁned by (3), satisﬁes the monopolist’s net-proﬁt-
maximizing condition (6) if s∗ is given by (4). By the assumption of




∗) for all q 6= q
so (7)
We assume that demand and cost functions are stationary over
time, and that there is no capital accumulation. The socially optimal
output level is qso at each point of time, and the time-independent
subsidy rate s∗ given by (4) induces the monopolist to produce this
output level at each point of time. To summarize, in a stationary
environment, the government can ensure eﬃciency by oﬀering the mo-
nopolist a linear subsidy schedule
S(q)=s
∗q (8)5
where s∗ is given by (4). The monopolist, taking this schedule as
given, will choose the output level qso. A major problem with this
subsidy rule is that it does not seem “fair” : the subsidy makes the
m o n o p o l i s te v e nr i c h e r .I nt h en e x ts u b s e c t i o n ,w ep r o p o s eac l a s so f
simple linear subsidy rules that do not enrich the monopolist as much
and still ensure that the eﬃcient output level qso is produced.
2.2. Performance-related linear subsidy rules
The government can construct an index that represents a mea-
sure of the cumulative performance of the monopolist. Let the “state
variable” X(t) be the value taken by that index at time t,w h e r e
X(0) = X0 > 0.H e r e ,X0 is to be chosen by the government at the
beginning of the game. The rate of change of X(t) is given by the
diﬀerential equation
˙ X(t)=q(t) − δX (t) (9)
where δ>0 is the rate of depreciation of the index (also to be chosen
by the government). The government announces to the monopolist, at
the beginning of the game, the diﬀerential equation (9), and its chosen
constants δ and X0. The government makes the binding commitment
that after time t0 =0 , it will not change the chosen constants. Note
that since q(t) ≥ 0 and X0 > 0,t h ei n d e xX(t) is always positive at
any ﬁnite t.
A possible interpretation of (9) is as follows. Suppose the govern-
ment sets X(0) =
qso
δ ,t h e na ss o o na st h em o n o p o l i s t ’ so u t p u tl e v e l
falls short of qso, the index X(t) will decrease, indicating that the ﬁrm
has “misbehaved”, and, with a well chosen subsidy rule, such misdeed
will entail a decrease in the subsidy rate. If the subsidy rule is well
designed the implicit threat of a decrease in the subsidy rate will in-
duce the ﬁrm’s optimal path to coincide with the socially desirable
production path. Alternatively, the government may set X(0) <
qso
δ
. Then a production of qso will raise the value of the index variable
X (t) upon which the subsidy rule is tuned. This behavior should6
be encouraged by an anticipation of a higher future subsidy rate, as
prescribed by a subsidy formula. If the prospect of a more favorable
subsidy rate is ﬁne-tuned by the government, the ﬁrm’s optimal path
will again coincide with the socially desirable production path.
The government announces at the outset a subsidy rule S(X,q)=
σ(X)q,w h e r eσ(X) is a function deﬁned for all X ≥ 0. Note that the
rule S(X,q)=σ(X)q is linear in q and non-linear in X.A tt i m et,t h e
monopolist will receive a net subsidy rate σ(X(t)) per unit of output,
i.e., he is given the subsidy amount σ(X(t))q(t) if he produces q(t)
when the index of his past behavior takes the value X(t). In the next
section, a concrete form of the function σ(X(t)) will be proposed, and
its eﬃciency implication investigated.
3. Achieving eﬃciency by rules based on a performance in-
dex
3.1. Designing a class of eﬃciency-inducing subsidy rules
We claim in this paper that the government can induce eﬃciency
with a class of performance-related subsidy rules that are linear in
output. In particular, we specify that σ(X(t)) takes the form
σ(X(t)) = s
∗ − KX(t)
−β and X (0) = X0 > 0 (10)
where K is a positive number, r is the interest rate, β ≡ r
δ +1> 1,
and s∗ is given by (4). We will show that eﬃcient production can be
ensured by appropriate choices of δ,K,a n dX0.T h ev a l u eo fK has to
be within a certain range to ensure that the monopolist earns positive
proﬁts, while δ and X0 must be chosen to ensure that the monopolist
does not exit the market in ﬁnite time; this will become clear in what
follows.
The class of rules speciﬁed by equation (10) has the property that





−β−1 > 0 (11)
Moreover note that for a given positive K the subsidy rule (10) results
in a negative subsidy rate, a tax, when the index variable X (t) is





β.T h u si ft h eﬁrm adopts
a production path that drives the index X (t) t oal e v e lb e l o w ¯ X the
subsidy changes into a tax.
The ﬁrm takes as given (i) the depreciation rule (9) and the depre-
ciation rate δ, (ii) the subsidy rule (10) and the constant K, and (iii)
the initial value X0.S i n c es = σ(X)=s∗ − KX−β,w ec a nw r i t e
π(q,s)=p(q)q − c(q)+σ(X)q ≡ R(q)+σ(X)q ≡ b π(q,X)
The ﬁrm chooses a time path q(t) ≥ 0 and T ≥ 0 to maximize the







subject to ˙ X = q−δX, q ≥ 0,a n dX(0) = X0.N o t et h a tt h eﬁrm can
ensure that the integral is non-negative: by choosing q(t)=0 ,p r o ﬁt
is zero at time t. Also, if the subsidy rule is not well designed, the ﬁrm
may choose to make a quick proﬁto v e rs o m eﬁnite time interval [0,T]
and exit the market at time T (that is, q(t)=0for t>T )t oa v o i d
future taxes. We call such a strategy the “hit and run" strategy. In
what follows we show that such a strategy will not be chosen by the
ﬁrm if the parameters K,δ, and X0 are well chosen.
3.2. The main results
We now state and prove our main results, Propositions 1 and 2.
Proposition 1: Assume the monopolist does not choose the "hit
and run" strategy. The per unit subsidy rate σ(X(t)) given by (10),
where K>0 and where X(t) satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation (9)8
ensures that the monopolist will always produce the socially optimal
output level qso,p r o v i d e dt h a t(K,δ,X0) satisfy the following condi-
tion











0 and where β =1 + r
δ.
Proof: We establish that there is a saddle-path that leads to a
unique steady state.
Let ψ(t) denote the co-state variable. The Hamiltonian associated
with the monopolist’s problem is
H = R(q)+s
∗q − KX
−βq + ψ[q − δX]
where
R(q)=p(q)q − c(q)
The Hamiltonian is concave in the state variable X because K ≥ 0.






The maximum principle gives
(i) the maximality condition: given ψ(t) and X(t),t h em o n o p o -





∗ + ψ − KX




(ii) the adjoint equation:
˙ ψ =( r + δ)ψ − βKX
−β−1q (16)
(iii) the transition equation:
˙ X = q − δX (17)







−rtψ(t) ≥ 0 (19)








We now show that, given any X0 > 0, we can construct the time

















































−δt = ˙ X
Using (23), we can verify that (16) is satisﬁed:
˙ ψ = −βKX









=( r + δ)ψ − βKX
−β−1q










in view of (14).
T h et i m ep a t ho ft h et r i p l e t(X,ψ,q) constructed above converges














In fact, it can be shown that, in the space (ψ,X), the constructed










This is done by showing that the phase-diagram displays the saddle-
point property (please see Appendix A).
The condition (13) is a suﬃcient condition for the monopolist to
have an incentive to participate in the program, i.e, the discounted
sum of the monopolist’s instantaneous proﬁts is non-negative. This is
shown in Appendix B
Unfortunately, the result in Proposition 1 is only "half" a good
news to the regulator. The possibility that the monopolist might
choose the "hit and run" strategy is real. This latter strategy will be
increasingly attractive when the subsidy rule oﬀered by the regulator
leaves the monopoly with a very small subsidy rate in the long-run.
This is illustrated with the following example.
Example (Hit and run):
Let p(q)=1− q , c(q)=0and r =0 .1.T h e n qso =1and






where δ =0 .1 (which yields β =2 ), and X is an index variable that
follows (9) with X(0) = X∞ ≡
qso
δ =1 0 . Such a subsidy rule belongs
to the family of subsidy rules (10) moreover given the choice of the
initial value of the index variable the subsidy rate will be constant11
over time if the monopolist produces the socially desirable production
rate. Let ¯ s denote the corresponding subsidy rate, the value of ¯ s will





The value of ¯ s can be made arbitrarily small (close to zero) by choosing
K close to 100. In the limit case where the parameter K is set at 100
we have ¯ s =0and choosing q(t)=qso =1yields zero proﬁts to the
monopolist for all t ≥ 0. But clearly, the monopolist can do better
by setting q(t)=1 /2, thus earning positive proﬁta tt i m et =0 .T h e
next instant, X(t) will fall, thus (1 − 100X(t)−2)q(t) < 0, i.e. he will
have to pay a tax. But since X(t) remains close to X0 for t ∈ (0,ε)
for some small ε, he continues to earn positive proﬁtb yc h o o s i n gq(t)
close to 1/2. After a while, he quits the industry, and his accumulated
proﬁt is positive.
In the following proposition, we give a suﬃcient condition on the
parameters of the subsidy rule that guarantees that the monopolist
will never choose the "hit and run" strategy and will produce the
socially desirable output level.
Proposition 2: The per unit subsidy rate σ(X(t)) given by (10),
where K>0 and where X(t) satisﬁes the diﬀerential equation (9)
ensures that the monopolist will always produce the socially optimal













Part 1: Ensuring that the monopolist does not adopt the “hit and
run" strategy.
We now show that condition (25) implies that the hit and run
strategy will not be chosen.12
(i) We ﬁrst show that the following condition is suﬃcient to ensure





where X(t) is the path of the index variable along the monopolist’s
optimal production path.
(ii) We then show that the condition (25) is suﬃcient for the con-
dition (26) to hold for all t>0.
(i) If the monopolist ﬁnds it optimal to adopt the “hit and run"








−β ≤ 0 (28)
In order for the monopolist not to adopt the hit and run strategy, we





−β ≤ 0 (29)
Clearly, a suﬃcient condition for this non-occurrence is (26), where
X(t) is the path of the index variable along the monopolist’s optimal
production path. This completes (i).
(ii) We now show that condition (25) is a suﬃcient condition for
(26) to hold.
Since R0(0) >R 0(δX0) for any positive δX0 by strict concavity, if
condition (25) holds we have
R






We now proceed to show that condition (25) will guarantee that
along the optimal production path chosen by the monopolist the index
variable X (t) will remain above X0. This would therefore complete13
(ii). To do this, it is convenient to introduce the concept of a myopic
monopolist. A myopic monopolist only cares about the instantaneous
proﬁt. Thus, for a given X0, a myopic monopolist will, at time t =0 ,
choose an output level that maximizes R(q)+σ(X0)q. This gives the







Here the superscript m stands for “myopic".














Clearly, a non-myopic monopolist never produces at time t =0an
output level less than qm(X0;K,δ).The reason is that if he does, his
current proﬁt will be lower than πm ≡ R(qm(X0;K,δ))+σ(X0)qm(X0;K,δ),
and his future proﬁtw i l la l s ob el o w e rt h a nπm as well because the
lower output will result in a lower stock X in the future, and hence a
lower future subsidy rate.
Now let us choose X0 (and (K,δ))s ot h a t
δX0 <q
m(X0;K,δ) (32)
This choice ensures that ˙ X will be positive when X = X0.I t
follows that if X0 satisﬁes condition (32), the (non-myopic) monopolist
will never run X to a level below X0. Thus, given (32), we have
X(t) >X 0 always. We now show that condition (25) ensures that
condition (32) is satisﬁed.
8Note that for qm > 0,w em u s th a v e−s∗ + KX
−β
0 <R 0(0),o r
R0(0) + s∗ >K X
−β
0 (31)
But this requirement is always satisﬁed when condition (25) is met, see inequality
(30).14
Recall that R0(.) is a decreasing function. Therefore the inequality











i.e., iﬀ (25) holds. Thus condition (25) ensures that X(t) >X 0 for all
t>0.
To summarize, condition (25) ensures (30) and that X(t) >X 0
for all t>0, and hence ensures that inequality (26) holds, which is a
suﬃcient condition for the hit-and-run strategy to be non-optimal for
the monopolist.
This completes Part 1.
Part 2: Part 1 and Proposition 1 complete the proof
Remark 1: Note that condition (25) guarantees that the hit and
run strategy is not optimal, therefore it is never optimal to "run" at
any time t ≥ 0 and by the same token guarantees the participation of
the monopolist to the program.
Remark 2: The set of triplets (K,δ,X0) that satisfy condition
(25) with K>0 is non-empty. In particular for any X0 <
qso
δ we have
R0 (δX0)+s∗ > 0 and therefore condition (25) yields 0 <K< ¯ K
0 <K< ¯ K (33)
where






Condition (32) can be interpreted as follows. For a given pair
(δ,X0)t h ev a r i a b l eK controls for the diﬀerence between the actual
subsidy rate s(t)=σ(X (t)) and standard (textbook) subsidy rate
s∗. For a given pair (δ,X0), the higher the value of K the bigger are15
the savings achieved by the regulator by using the subsidy rate s(t)
instead of the constant subsidy rate s∗. Condition (32) states that
there is an upper bound on the level of these savings that ensures that
the ﬁrm will not opt for the hit and run strategy.












∗ − s0) <s ∞ (34)
where s0 denotes the initial subsidy rate at time t =0and s∞ the








where X∞ =( 1 /δ)qso. Condition (34) stipulates that for a given
δ and initial subsidy rate s0 there is a minimum subsidy rate that
the regulator must provide at the steady state that ensures that the
monopoly will not choose the hit and run strategy .
3.4. A numerical example
Let P (q)=1− q and c(q)=0 .T h e nqso =1and s∗ =1 . Note
that the use of a constant per unit subsidy s∗ =1requires that at each
moment a total amount of subsidy of $1 to generate a social surplus




where δ =0 .1, K =2 0and X(0) = X0 =2
√
5 then the monopolist
will produce at each moment the socially desirable output qso =1 .
The amount of subsidy per unit of output will monotonically increase
from 0 (at time t0 =0 )t o0.80 at the steady state. Along the optimal



















T h es t e a d ys t a t es u b s i d yr a t ew i t ht h i ss u b s i d yr u l ei s2 0 %b e l o wt h e













If the static subsidy rate was used the present value of the stream of




Using the dynamic subsidy rule above results in a decrease by more
than 44% in the present value of the subsidies given to the monopolist.
4. Conclusion
We have provided a continuum of subsidy rules that induce a
monopoly to choose the socially optimal production level. These sub-
sidy rules result in a reduction of the amount of subsidy transferred
to the monopolist compared to the standard case where a constant
subsidy rate is used. The subsidy rules depend on a state variable
that reﬂects the monopolist’s past performance and that depreciates
over time, therefore requiring a permanent eﬀort of the monopolist to
maintain it at an optimal level. The use of such subsidy rules can
achieve signiﬁcant cost savings for the government compared to the
use of a standard constant subsidy rate. We have provided a numer-
ical example with a linear demand and no production cost, in which
the subsidy costs of inducing eﬃciency are reduced by almost ﬁfty
percent.17
The proposed class of subsidy rules can be used in diﬀerent ways
depending on the priorities of the regulator. A possible objective
could be to achieve the socially optimal output level with the small-
est amount of initial subsidy. This could be the case if the regulator
initially faces severe budget constraints. Alternatively the objective
could be achieving the eﬃcient output level while meeting a target
level of subsidy at the steady state, perhaps because a ceiling on long-
run subsidies is imposed by some multilateral agreement.
It is possible to extend our results to the case of oligopolists that
play dynamic games as dynamic Cournot rivals; see Benchekroun
and Long (1998) for a possible framework for dynamic symmetric
oligopoly9. Another worthwhile extension is to consider the case where
t h eg o v e r n m e n tc a n n o tm a k el o n gt e r mc o m m i t m e n tt ot h ep a r a m e -
ters of the subsidy rules. In such cases, a feedback equilibrium of a
diﬀerential game would have to sought10.
Acknowledgements: We thank SSHRC and FCAR for ﬁnancial
supports, and Kim Long and Koji Shimomura for useful discussions
and references.
9In an asymmetric oligopoly, complications may arise; see Long and Soubeyran
(2003).
10For examples of feedback equilibrium see Shimomura (1991) and Dockner et
al. (2000).18
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Appendix A












then the optimal q is positive and satisﬁes
R
0(q)+s
∗ + ψ − KX
−β =0
We construct a phase diagram in the space (X,ψ). N o t et h a ts i n c e
q ≥ 0 and X0 > 0, X can never become negative. It follows that in
the phase diagram in the space (X,ψ), there are two regions. Region
A is the set of points (X,ψ) such that (35) holds, and region B is
the set of points (X,ψ) such that (36) holds. The upper boundary of





Along this curve, as X tends to zero, ψ tends to inﬁnity, and as X
tends to inﬁnity, ψ tends the the negative number −R0(0) − s∗;a t






































We now show that there exists a unique steady state in region B.









∞ q(X∞,ψ ∞) (38)
And setting ˙ X =0 ,w eg e t
q(X∞,ψ ∞)=δX∞ (39)








∗ − ψ∞ = R
0(δX∞) (41)




Comparing (14) with (42) we deduce that
δX∞ = q
so (43)











Now we show that the steady state has the saddlepoint property.
Deﬁne









(evaluated at the steady state) has a negative determinant (.i.e., has
o n en e g a t i v er o o ta n do n ep o s i t i v er o o t ) .
Mψ = r + δ + βKX
−β−1φ
0(Z)



















































































MψNX − NψMX = −δ
2 − rδ − {2δ + r − δ(β +1 ) }βφ
0(Z)KX
−β−1
MψNX − NψMX = −δ
2 − rδ − {δ + r − δβ}βφ
0(Z)KX
−β−1
recalling that βδ = r + δ,
MψNX − NψMX = −δ
2 − rδ < 0






has the saddlepoint property
Appendix B:














It follows that the monopolist’s present value of the proﬁts t r e a mi s














































is the average proﬁt of the text-book monopolist (with the text-book
subsidy).
It follows that if X0 >
qso
δ , then (recalling that β>0) as u ﬃcient


















δ ,t h e nas u ﬃcient condition for (45) to hold is






Solving the diﬀerential equation (9) along the optimal production
path and using












If we denote the initial subsidy level s0 and the steady state subsidy
level s∞ we have
s



































The condition (25) that guarantees that the monopolist will not choose
the hit and run strategy is
R
0 (δX0) > −s0













δ +1) X∞ < (R
0)
−1 (−s0) (48)











∗ − s0) <s ∞